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Introduction
Beginning from the 1970’s in philosophy 
of language influential concepts emphasizing 
essential meaning of belief in linguistic 
activity of the subject started to appear (Fodor, 
1983; Searle, 1975, 1983). These concepts are 
subjected to the thorough criticism (Petrov, 
1987, 1990; Lectorskiy, 2006) which fairly 
reproduces their important defects, ambiguities 
and basic insufficiency in the interpretation of 
statements producing process within the frames 
of a natural language (For example, in Searle’s 
theory of intentionality statements producing 
process is explained as initiated by a condition 
of conviction, desirability and sensation. But to 
speak about desires, sensations and furthermore, 
about belief and intentions with reference to the 
person considering them as something essentially 
extralanguage it is inadmissible. And if it’s so 
then in Searle’s case the language behavior is 
explained as caused by conscious-language 
factors and conditions. But then in order to avoid 
the tautology additional analysis of the linguistic 
status of these conditions and mechanisms of 
their interrelation with concrete speech acts 
is necessary). At the same time knowledge of 
essence of belief positive functions in language 
realization of the subject still remains incomplete. 
Thus in this article problems of the nature and the 
influence of phenomenon of belief (Analyzing 
phenomenon of belief it’s necessary to give its 
preliminary definition: belief is understood here 
as a mental act, condition or habit of placing trust 
or confidence in a person, idea or thing. Such 
definition implies both belief which rest to some 
extent on proof or material evidence (though 
they cannot be rigorous or immediately given) 
and belief which doesn’t rest on them at least 
distinctly. In the latter case belief can reveal itself 
as a religious belief (belief in God), that is faith, 
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which is particular belief state. Such approach 
to definition of belief gives an opportunity to 
understand that non-religious belief and religious 
belief with all the differences between them have 
the same nature) on linguistic activity of the 
subject are considered.
Belief represents an original and besides 
a syncretic component of a subjective reality, 
because it incorporates elements of different 
gnoseological and psychological nature: rational-
conceptual structures, emotionally-sensual and 
strong-willed states. Moreover, belief which is 
paradoxical enough is some special knowledge, 
namely the knowledge that substitutes ignorance 
and accepted as necessary transition or synthesis 
to that knowledge which should be intersubjective, 
i.e. to that knowledge which should be presented 
in demonstrative, obligatory forms. The 
knowledge in the latter case appears as actual 
knowledge, i.e. as a result of informative display 
of real events and processes, a result presented 
in the form of the cause-and-effect statements 
(laws) empirically checked up and confirmed. 
In contradistinction to it, belief knowledge as a 
belief component has other content – presumable 
and not-realizable. However, in its form belief 
knowledge is still the knowledge, which is 
represented as a connection of abstract concepts. 
Here there is a true possibility to oppose 
knowledge and belief to each other, though, of 
course, this opposition cannot be absolute. After 
all the presumable knowledge can be confirmed 
subsequently, and on the other hand the system 
of the proved knowledge usually contains fictions 
and conventions (see, in particular, Dubrovskiy, 
2002, p. 84-310). At the same time it is clear that 
belief and knowledge cannot be identified. Belief 
as it was already mentioned is a complex mental 
condition of a subject (individual or collective 
one) since in this condition emotionally-sensual, 
intuitive, unconscious and rational components 
of a subjective reality are specially synthesized 
and in this synthesis the first three components 
seriously overweight the rational one1. 
Thus, despite certain rational “insufficiency” 
in its structure, belief acts as utmost (not as 
some private) spiritual metaattitude “entitling” 
the person in all of his/her activity. In this case 
ontological and gnoseological analyses of belief 
appear to be insufficient and they are fairly 
supplemented by praxeological and axiological 
analyses of belief (see Dubrovskiy, 2002). From 
positions of the philosophical-anthropological 
approach synthesizing these four kinds of the 
analysis of belief, in its unity with the semiotic 
approach we’ll try to explain genesis of belief, to 
reproduce some important belief characteristics 
and also to determine functions of belief in 
statements producing process.
Genesis of belief  
and essential characteristics of belief 
According to psychological, philosophical 
and linguistic data, the transition from merely 
sensory ways of the information processing by 
living systems to primitive languages of rational 
reproduction of the reality was connected with 
appearance of a verb, and consequently with 
comprehension of an agent (subject) (Meillet, 
2002) who, on conditions of practice, was the 
human being himself. As a result a specific 
linguistic and intellectual attitude of basic 
subject-realization appeared. In the field of 
intellectuality, subject-realization revealed itself 
in understanding that a subject is the one who 
produces an action. And in the field of language, 
subject-realization revealed itself in appearance 
of precisely expressed subject and predicate in 
1 Thus knowledge as a component of belief is a so-called 
tacit knowledge (see Polanyi, 1985). And in the case of 
religious belief tacit knowledge has phantomlike, mysti-
cal character. So if in the frame of non-religious belief 
tacit knowledge can turn to explicit, proved knowledge 
in the process of cognition, then in the frame of religious 
belief such turning at least by means of ordinary logic as 
it will be shown further looks in principle impossible. 
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initially united words-sentences. This grammar 
and logic separation was the evidence of new 
form of calculus mechanisms 2 that are in the 
base of evolutionary improvement of language. It 
proves, first, that ancestors of the modern human 
being had already a variety of language means 
of information reception and processing (sensory 
language and verbal language), and, second, 
that a specific linguistic-intellectual attitude 
of super subject-realization had been formed. 
Namely translanguage character of connections 
(relationships) between these language systems 
has caused the appearance of super subject-
realization that is the appearance of specific 
mental metaattitude. It means that there is 
intellectual and sensual state of the subject and 
this state somehow “is built on” above his/her 
states and actions as a certain independent carrier 
of an action or an idea. At first super subject-
realization reveals itself in passive constructions 
and also in designing an illusory subject. All this 
finally has entailed the formation of mythological 
and religious sign-symbolical systems and 
languages. According to K. Uhlenbek, North 
American Indian considers himself/herself not 
as an independent producer of an action, but as 
2 Calculus mechanisms here are understood as such way 
of the reality representation when to its objects and 
phenomena material configurations/signs (neural con-
nections, sounds, letters, words, figures, etc.) are put in 
conformity; and then according to accepted in system (in 
the central nervous system, in system of verbal language 
etc.) rules (conclusion rules) the operations which are 
necessary for the decision of a concrete tasks are made 
with them. It is obvious that for living systems including 
human being maximally generalized immediate task is 
the task of survival which in the evolution process of the 
person and a human society gets the certain specifica-
tion. As to the conclusion rules which are the important 
characteristic of calculus mechanisms it is necessary to 
notice that they are not limited in this case to rules of 
formal logic. Thus calculus mechanisms appear to be 
plurality of logic principles and their supplementation. 
Concept of calculation if to treat it widely, i.e. not to 
identify it exclusively with numerical and formal-logic 
operations can be considered as a synonym of calculus 
mechanisms and at the same time can designate concrete 
cases of their display (including numerical and formal-
logic operations).
an executor of it, as the one who causes it. The 
Indian’s way of speech should reflect this his/her 
outlook (Meshchaninov, 1975).
Taking it into account, it is necessary to 
specify the status of such illusory “agent”, i.e. 
of subject. In the Homer’s poems one can find 
an expression “Zeus is raining” instead of “it’s 
raining” (Meillet, 2002). On this occasion N. 
Marr wrote that all so-called impersonal verbs – 
Russian “меня лихорадит”, French “il pleut”, 
German “es regnat” – in fact are personal because 
the subject here should be understood as a totem 
(Marr, 1933-1937, p. 91-92)3. Illusory (irreal) 
subject in the form of mythological personification 
or in the forms of impersonal verbs, despite of 
its archaism, can be considered as an evidence 
of significant cogitative reorganizations, namely 
both mystic-mythological and “impersonal” 
perception of the subject of action meant a 
movement of consciousness on a way of the 
increasing generalization and abstraction. In 
this case the subject is understood not simply 
as a concrete person, whose borders and space 
are quite definite (which usual (personal) 
verbs characterized by), but as “a universal 
subject” – the carrier of unlimited forces and an 
arbitrariness. Such understanding of the subject, 
undoubtedly, occurred with the participation of 
sensory-emotional states of an ancient human 
being which meant an interaction of rational and 
sensual code structures, and the result of that was 
the initial formation of super subject-realization. 
Subsequently these archaic forms of super 
subject-realization disappeared or were replaced. 
However the mechanism of their generation 
turned out to be effective and productive and led, 
in particular, to the appearance of such complex 
form of super subject-realization as belief.
3 The fact that there is a semantic subject in so-called 
impersonal sentences is proved also by contemporary 
linguistic investigations (Zolotova, 1982; Pavlov, 1992; 
Tarlanov, 1998).
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Before turning strictly to the belief 
characteristics analysis it’s necessary to 
emphasize that super subject-realization cannot 
be understood as a certain intellectual-linguistic 
phenomenon which is placed out of individual 
subject. Super subject-realization is an intrasubject 
property, though it has social origin and socially 
articulated functioning. Certainly, there are 
rather distinct philosophical traditions (for 
example transcendentalism of German classical 
philosophy, psychoanalysis etc.), which consider 
super subject-realization to be independent from 
the subject. But some of them mystify super 
subject-realization (transcendentalism); others 
emphasize suppressing influence of external 
depersonalized super subject-realization on 
the person (psychoanalysis). It’s true that these 
traditions, each one in its own way, confirm the 
linguistic-intellectual nature of super subject-
realization formation, but understanding of 
super subject-realization proved in this article is 
more universal and natural. This understanding 
definitely confirms that every normally developed 
subject has an ability to be a carrier of super 
subject-realization and this last one is his/her 
linguistic-intellectual property and a condition 
which along with other mental components 
carries out an active function in generation of 
statements, especially significant statements. 
These significant statements are those which 
express constructive-reconstructive, i.e. creative 
possibilities of the subject. 
Super subject-realization is carried out by the 
subject both in a mode of intellectual-strong-willed 
management, and in a mode of “autonomous” 
work of his/her central nervous system, when a 
subject is relaxing but at the same time he/she is in 
the state of an intellectual problem solution. But 
in both cases super subject-realization represents 
the utmost level of linguistic-intellectual freedom 
of the subject, and it’s remarkable that in the latter 
“not strong-willed” case super subject-realization 
can be perceived as an «unexpected finding». At 
the same time situations of such freedom testify 
information management and self-management 
in the sphere of intellectual activity of the 
subject. In “an autonomous” mode – situations 
of insight, intuitions, inspiration – super subject-
realization can provide the maximum creative 
effect, though, it’s clear that such effect does not 
always necessarily take place. 
Belief has a super subject-realization status 
because an agent in it starts to be realized as a 
certain subject who transforms the real subject – 
the carrier of even not thorough developed abstract 
thinking – into the object of his will and reason. 
Such result in its very beginning was caused by 
a new form of calculus mechanisms, the basis 
of which was an interaction of languages of 
different types. In the state of developed abstract 
thinking a subject has even more rich typology 
of languages and developed code organization of 
brain work which corresponds to them. All this 
is the basis of formation of belief as the syncretic 
spiritual metaformation defining all kinds of 
realized mental activity and real acts of a subject. 
In this connection it is necessary to specify the 
well-known statement of M. Polanyi according 
to which one should acknowledge again, that the 
belief is a source of knowledge (Polanyi, 1985, 
p. 277). The fact is that this statement puts at 
once such question as what the source of belief 
is. One should answer this question the following 
way: initially belief as a specific component of 
a subjective reality is a result of development of 
cognitive structures and functions of the highest 
nervous activity of a human being, that is a result 
of dissipation of the language-symbolical means, 
of formation of new calculus opportunities 
within the frames of these means, and then it 
is a result of their additional complication and 
enrichment. Thus source of belief attitude are 
those information invariants which are presented 
by code interactions (calculations) of the highest 
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nervous activity. It means that phylogenetically 
cognitive processes are the base, the source of 
belief attitude. So it is possible to assume that at 
the initial stages of its formation in phylogenesis 
of a person belief attitude revealed itself as “the 
silent statement”, “silent consent”, “silent belief”. 
There are two reasons that make such assumption 
possible, first, animals with developed mentality 
already have such form of belief, and, second, 
such form of belief is a deep basis of realized 
forms of belief which are only homo sapiens 
has. “Silent belief”, operating not obviously, but 
intuitively or retrospectively, acts at the level of 
highly developed animals and the human being 
as the fundamental factor of biological self-
organization providing a survival of a living 
being (Dubrovskiy, 2002, p. 303-304). 
Ontogenetically belief attitude arises in the 
process of overcoming of problematical character 
and insufficiency of available knowledge. Belief 
in this case acts as some sort of gangway from 
available knowledge to possible new knowledge. 
On the one hand such gangway is available in 
“stock”, and on the other, it’s completed whenever 
it’s necessary, and the completion material is 
again some “cognitive content” having “obvious 
or not obvious propositional structure”. In 
this respect D. Dubrovskiy referring to J. 
Margolis (Margolis, 1986) fairly considers that 
propositional structure can exist irrespectively 
of whether it’s expressed in language or not, 
and the researcher reasonably adds that most 
likely it is fair with respect to those subjective 
states of “not verbal ideas (thinking)” which are 
peculiar to the person possessing the developed 
language competence (Dubrovskiy, 2002, p. 
290). Thus belief being understood here as “an 
act of acceptance of defined cognitive content” 
(Dubrovskiy, 2002, p. 294), is based on some 
knowledge, is expressed in many respects as a 
knowledge, and only then belief can serve as a 
factor of knowledge augment.
Belief reveals itself as a high level of a 
coordination of spiritually-mental structures of the 
subject, which help the subject to take an effective 
decision in a difficult situation (it represents his 
original existential basis). And this coordination, 
being not completely realizable for the subject 
(and in this sense being “ignorant knowledge”), 
is formed and continued by behavioral successes, 
when some sort of cause and effect connection 
appeared, and in this connection a causal 
part remains out of full explanation. These 
characteristics of belief show its significance as a 
value, because in a productive part of its evolution 
belief carries out the interconnected functions 
of an element of personal management and self-
management, of a stimulator of steady initiative 
and creative behavior and also of internal spiritual 
mediator of person integrity. 
In the further realizations (for different 
reasons) belief can undergo various transformations. 
First, it can be a monotonously-obligatory state. 
Though in this case belief will continue to carry 
out integrating function, it will do so basically in 
inertial-conservative mode that means a crisis of 
belief and an appearance of doubt. Second, for this 
reason (disability of belief to keep and develop 
initiative-creative potential of a person) serious 
change of belief can take place.
Thus, if belief assumes knowledge and 
knowledge contains belief components, so 
noted discredit of available belief assumes the 
ascertainment of a role of doubt in the process of 
belief discredit. We will concern here neither the 
importance of historical-philosophical tradition 
in the analysis of a category of doubt, nor the 
detailed reproduction of positive modern results 
of such analysis. Suffice it to be guided by some 
characteristics summarizing both lines of the 
analysis of doubt. 
It is clear that the doubt is essentially 
important both for cognitive process and for 
states of belief. Thus the greater degree of doubt 
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in knowledge and belief a subject possesses, the 
smaller becomes a degree of strength of his/her 
knowledge and belief. However as it is impossible 
to imagine that a level of belief and knowledge 
is equal to zero, so, obviously, (this again can be 
perceived as a paradox) a level of doubt never 
happens to be equal to zero. Liquidation of distrust 
factuality, as well as liquidation of intellectual 
significance of doubt, means liquidation of belief 
and knowledge. In the process of affirmation of 
successful knowledge everything that contradicts 
to it is eliminated by means of doubt and, besides, 
by means of doubt the vulnerable moments in a 
positive part of knowledge are withdrawn. The 
same things happen with usual (personal, civil) 
belief. And in the case of doubt removal both 
knowledge and belief pass into a dogmatism and 
blindness zone. However the maximum, total 
measure of doubt completely disarms the person 
in cognition and behavior, depriving him/her of 
any positive reference points. At the same time 
belief directions, that are reliable enough, can not 
only positively focus behavior of the person, but 
also define his/her unacceptance of humanistic 
harmful elements of possible own behavior and 
behavior of associates. 
Belief can have both special character (for 
example, in case of I. Kepler’s confidence that the 
way of planetary orbits organization conforms 
to mathematical laws), and universal character, 
assuming interosculation of the most general 
ideas about the universe and about positions of a 
human being in it. So, it is possible to believe, for 
example, in orderliness and harmony of the world, 
in probability of events in it. And it is possible 
to believe also in all these things together and in 
addition to this to believe in special orderliness 
in this world – in being of the person. I. Kant’s 
well-known statements, given in the conclusion 
to his «Critique of practical reason», are perfectly 
express it (we will afford volume citing): «Two 
things fill the mind with ever new and increasing 
admiration and awe, the more often and the more 
steadily we reflect on them, they are: the starry 
heavens above and the moral law within. I have 
not to search for them and conjecture them as 
though they were veiled in darkness or were in 
the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see 
them before me and connect them directly with the 
consciousness of my existence. The former begins 
from the place I occupy in the external world of 
sense, and enlarges my connection therein to an 
unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and 
systems of systems, and moreover into limitless 
times of their periodic motion, its beginning and 
continuance. The second begins from my invisible 
self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world 
which has true infinity, but which is traceable 
only by the understanding, and with which I 
discern that I am not in a merely contingent 
but in a universal and necessary connection, as 
I am also thereby with all those visible worlds» 
(Kant, 1965, p. 499-500; WWW). It’s necessary 
to add only that Kant substantiating a unity of the 
utmost purpose of the nature and the moral law 
carrier of which is person recognized a morally-
teleological substantiation of God’s life. For us, 
however, though it’s clear that there is no need 
in divine definition of moral establishments of a 
person, but still essentially important remains a 
unity of the world of the nature and the world of a 
person in all of vital activities of the last one. 
Thus, cited statements illustrate very well the 
properties of fully represented belief: it unites the 
ideas about the bases of the nature with knowledge 
of them, with general ethical requirements, and 
also with aesthetic representations. «The starry 
sky over me» is not only briefly expressed 
mechanics of space in unity with a person, but also 
it is briefly expressed aesthetic representation. In 
connection with this at least two more important 
properties of belief are found out: 1) belief exists 
and is expressed in the person in «large-block» 
without a detailed articulation which is carried out 
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only in concrete behavior of the person; 2) belief 
has philosophical character – it’s synthesis of the 
principles, full articulation of which grows in 
philosophy where person is proved as the purpose 
of herself/himself.
Religious, confessional belief (that is faith), 
having as its object supernatural and in all senses 
absolute, is a specific kind of belief. In this case 
not only the object of belief gets transcendental 
characteristics, but also belief attitude itself is 
understood as having transcendental character, 
i.e. as caused by the connection of a person with 
the Absolute. Thus object, mystery-topic and 
ceremonial components of belief are perceived as 
the unconditional (absolute, indisputable) true at a 
level of regularly operating positive religiousness, 
that is they are perceived as coinciding with 
present and predicted constructive forms of 
day-to-day life. Standard organized confessions 
aspire to separate from mysticism as they see in it 
a germ of high degree of individualization of the 
religiousness leading to infringement of integrity 
of the doctrine and to appearance of heresies 
(Mechkovskaya, 1998). Nevertheless primary 
mystic of the Creed develops in practice into 
collective supermysticism. Archetypical-mystical 
in this case can reveal itself especially persistently 
both at the individual and collective levels and 
gravitates towards serious strengthening, which 
in some cases can lead to mass psychoses and 
antihuman orientation (the religious fanaticism, 
extremism and terrorism). 
Religious, confessional belief, besides, 
has strongly pronounced canonical-dogmatic 
character: the object of belief and the ways of 
attitude to it are canonized in two ways – initially 
historical and situational-historical. The first 
means absolutely canonical set and character of the 
plots directed on disclosing of an object essence 
of belief and the ways of attitude to it, and also the 
form of their verbal expression; the second means 
historically pragmatic admissible transformation 
of the interpretation of these plots and this 
interpretation not only destroys an opportunity 
of individual perusal of theological documents, 
but also really deforms (distorts) them. It’s not 
a coincidence, that outstanding freedom-loving 
Russian philosopher – N. Berdyaev wrote: “I have 
a real disgust for theological-dogmatic conflicts. I 
feel pain reading history of ecumenical councils”; 
“…historical revelation was secondary for me, in 
comparison with spiritual revelation”; “Revelation 
assumes activity of not only Revealing, but also 
of the one who perceives revelation. Revelation 
is binomial” (Berdyaev, 1991, p. 354, 210, 204). 
The statements of N. Berdyaev show religious, 
confessional belief can get sometimes personal 
character4. Usually it happens when a believer has 
a variety of linguistic-intellectual means. Only 
having these means a person is capable to enter 
into a wide context of the reality which includes 
achievements and problems of science and art. In 
this respect not only N. Berdyaev’s position, but 
also V. Solovyev’s position is rather significant. 
Though they are considered (which is fair enough) 
as religious thinkers, undoubtedly, they are not 
only and not simply religious. Religiousness 
of these thinkers not only dissatisfies the 
requirements of orthodox religiousness, but in 
some cases turns into anti-religiousness, for 
example: V. Solovyev (Solovyev, 1995) separates 
ethics and religion5, N. Berdyaev distinctly 
proclaims individuality of interpretation of 
4 Unlike traditional confessional belief personal belief as-
sumes high degree revelation of individual-personal ele-
ment in its organization and freedom from dogmatism. 
Examples of personal belief it’s necessary to search in 
civil (secular) form of belief realization though as it was 
already mentioned separate cases of individual-personal 
transformation of confessional belief also can be per-
ceived as examples of personal belief.
5 Solovyev writes in particular, that: «The moral philoso-
phy does not depend entirely on positive religion … At 
existence of many religions and creeds disputes between 
them assume the general moral ground… and, hence, 
ethical standards to which the arguing sides equally re-
fer, cannot depend on their religious and creed distinc-
tions» (Solovyev, 1996, p. 7).
– 63 –
Nina V. Malchukova. Nature of Belief and Role of Belief in Statements Producing Process
Revelation, perceiving with bewilderment and 
despondency (depression) conflicts of orthodoxy. 
Explaining this one should take into account that 
they are gifted persons whose gift is conditioned 
by and reveals itself in a variety of semiotic-
linguistic means designing their general spiritual 
potential. Each of them is a magnificent expert on 
history, art culture, philosophy; each of them is an 
expert both in the field of poetry and in the field 
of philosophical essayistic and at the same time 
each of them is the recognized original author in 
philosophical creativity.
Probably, as a special case of “reconciliation” 
and “consent” of personal and confessional 
belief can be considered P. A. Florenskiy’s 
reasoning on the status of actual infinity and on 
the Scriptures contradictions. Being an expert 
on problems of mathematics, a logician and 
partly semiotician orthodox ordained believer 
P.A. Florenskiy, arguing on actual infinity in 
connection with Cantor’s formulation of this 
problem, proves such infinity to be an absolute 
maximum (no more subjected to increase) in 
a sense of maximum identity to God as it is 
treated traditionally by theologicians. Other 
kinds of actual infinity are, first, “in concreto, 
in the dependent world, in a creature in natura 
naturata” and, second, “in abstracto, in a spirit, 
because it has a possibility to learn Transfinitum 
in the nature and, to a certain extent, Absolutum 
in God” (Phlorenskiy, 1990, p. 498-499). But 
in these cases we deal only with symbols of 
infinite, whereas real instance of infinite is 
God. Similarly to it, fairly marking that formal-
logic law of the contradiction inadmissibility 
is not absolute and agreeing with presence of 
contradictions in the Scriptures, the religious 
thinker concludes: “… there is no need to assure 
rationalist that there are no contradictions: they 
are available; yes, they also are doubtless. But 
rationalist should believe mystic that these 
contradictions appear to be the highest unity in 
the light of Never-Setting Sun and then exactly 
these contradictions show that the Scriptures 
and dogmas are above flesh reasoning and hence 
they could not be thought up by the person, i.e. 
they are divine” (Phlorenskiy, 1990, p. 505). 
Comments, as the saying goes, are unnecessary 
here. It is possible only to emphasize that putting 
noted problems in “bosom” of divine clarity is a 
method which doesn’t guarantee advancement 
in their solution. 
Functions of belief  
in statements producing process
Belief in any of its forms (whether 
personal or confessional) is a semiotic-
pragmatic spiritual formation that has super 
subject-realization nature. This formation 
carries out functions of self-determination and 
self-substantiation of a person when the person 
correlates accepted general regulations with 
general plans of actions, with cardinal acts, 
with significant speech self-expression. As for 
the ability of belief to generate statements it’s 
necessary to emphasize here that belief itself is 
a phenomenon generated by propositions (even 
not obviously), but at the same time it certainly 
participates in generation of statements 
(propositions) and texts. Participating in the 
statements generation process belief carries out 
the following functions: 
– Initiating and stimulating function. In 
this case belief not only in some ways turns on, 
starts the mechanism of generation of statements 
of certain semantic loading, but also supports, 
stimulates it; 
– Controlling and authorizing function. 
Carrying out this function, belief, on the one 
hand, authorizes selection of the language 
means working both towards the solution of an 
intellectual problem, and towards accepted belief 
directions, strengthening this belief directions, 
answering it (here rather significant is the use of 
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the figurative, metaphorical, emotionally loaded 
constructions); and on the other hand, supervises, 
does not allow the use of the language means that 
level it; 
– Extrapolating function. In this case there 
is a distribution of propositions of belief – the 
statements establishing an object of belief – on 
the majority of other statements which directly 
haven’t been connected with this object. In 
other words, these or those belief directions 
accepted by the subject, belief attitude realized 
by the subject can define speech behavior of the 
subject on the whole. So, for example, belief 
of a person in herself or himself, in her/his 
abilities and calling, let’s say calling of teacher, 
is capable to set the general tone (syntactic and 
semantic) to each particular case of person’s 
speech realization out of a school or high school 
audience; 
– Synthesizing function. Carrying out this 
function, belief affects the composite organization 
of texts both written, and oral. So performance of 
this function by belief, for example in frameworks 
of confessional belief, promotes the formation of 
such initial genres of religious communication as 
Revelation, sermon and prayer.
 Also taking into account this function 
it’s necessary to show how confessional 
belief can influence both religious and secular 
communication strategies. For example in the 
Scriptures religions, in particular in Christianity 
and Islam, fideistic and non-conventional 
relation to a word appears to be connected 
closely with a principle ipse dixit6 in the former 
case and with a category of isnad7 in the latter 
case. Noted principle and category can be taken 
as an evidence of the same communicative aim: 
6 Ipsi dixit (in Latin) means somebody main one — teach-
er, leader, master— has told (see Mechkovskaya, 1998, 
p. 140).
7 Isnad is a chain of reference to narrators in collections of 
legends about Prophet Muhammad and in other Muslim 
treatises (see Mechkovskaya, 1998, p.170).
to keep most important information. And though 
secular contexts of the XIX century in relation to 
a principle ipse dixit already are basically ironic, 
this principle even without former seriousness 
and indisputability still remains a reference 
point in modern communication space. As to 
isnad, then first, in Islamic bookishness isnad 
even in a greater degree, than the principle 
ipse dixit in the European culture, brought up 
Muslim theologician and lawyer in a constant 
orientation on authorities, and, secondly, 
isnad’s manifestations and a consequence of 
them represent one of the powerful factors of 
traditionalism in Islamic culture (Mechkovskaya, 
1998, p. 171). 
In the cultures based on doctrines and 
religious practice of Buddhism and Daoism 
in their diverse variations (Lamaism, dzen-
Buddhism, late daoists), a question Who has told 
it?, which is in the base of a principle ipse dixit 
and of a category of isnad, has no fundamental 
value in communications management. Fideistic 
and non-conventional relation to the word 
isn’t peculiar to Buddhism and Daoism, on the 
contrary basic mistrust to the letter, to a frozen 
form, to a canon, to ability of language to help 
intuition are peculiar to them. It’s well-known that 
dzen-Buddhist monks prefer language of images 
to language of words, and one dzen comparison 
says: to put truth into words it is not easier than to 
fish by a narrow-necked pumpkin (Konrad, 1980, 
p. 119-120, 122).
On the whole, carrying out noted 
functions, belief can be perceived as some sort 
of statements catalyst because it is capable to 
strengthen and accelerate statements influence 
on interlocutor. If we consider that the vector 
of fully represented belief can have a different 
orientation both humanistic, and antihumanistic, 
then it’s obvious that belief catalization of 
statements can have both positive, and negative 
value. 
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Conclusion
To sum up it’s necessary to emphasize 
that belief is always some knowledge existing 
in synthesis with ethic-aesthetic components, 
which is accompanied and supplemented with 
emotionally-strong-willed experiences; belief 
possesses mutually supplementing properties – 
to be a steady spiritual complex and, at the same 
time, to have certain dynamics: belief complex 
differs personally and besides it can change in the 
evolution of a person. 
The semiotic approach to the analysis of 
belief shows the certain analytical opportunities 
in revealing the spiritual status and specificity 
of this phenomenon. Due to this approach that 
allocates three aspects (attitude) of any sign 
system – semantic, pragmatic and syntactic – it 
appears possible to fix independence of belief 
as a pragmatic formation of super subject-
realization nature. And genesis of this formation 
has strong connections with the development 
of general fundamental linguistic-semiotic and 
gnoseological procedures, such as generalization, 
abstraction and metaphor-making. Moreover, 
the given approach allows revealing a 
predominating role of the general spirituality of 
a person, constituted by languages of science, 
art, philosophy in relation to belief. Personal 
belief, being the certain “organizing” part of 
spirituality, does not assume a constant and strict 
conscious regulation of any behavioral step. A 
variety of linguistic-semiotic means which a 
person has, person’s solution of different sort of 
specific targets, mediating the main directions of 
activity, weakens, and even completely removes 
a constancy of belief dictatorship. It makes clear, 
that belief carries out infrastructural functions in 
language realization. 
Personal belief, leaning on fundamental 
“blocks” of the general spirituality of a person 
more freely than confessional belief, promotes 
expansion of borders of the general personal 
freedom and is capable of providing overcoming 
of person’s excessive mental isolation. Besides (for 
noted reasons) personal belief is more inclined to 
transformations, reconstruction and change. 
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